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PROJECT SUi;ARY
The M.I.T. World Oil Project is developing improved methods and data for
analysis of the future course of the world oil market. Market forecasts
depend on analysis of likely demand for oil imports by major consuming
countries, and the supply from exporters who behave as "price-takers" in their
oil exploration and production. The resulting net demand for oil from the
core members of the oil cartel determines the ability of OPEC to set prices.
In the World Oil Project, study of net demand for cartel oil is accompanied by
analysis of the likely behavior of the price-setters themselves, and
exploration of the details of market structure as they influence price
behavior and trade patterns.
The work involves a set of studies of oil supply from key producer areas,
import demand from major consumers, and the integration of estimated.supply
and demand functions into a simulation model for studying future
developments. The simulation framework is combined with a separate set of
behavioral models of the cartel-core nations and their price-setting
decisions, and with studies of evolving contract arrangements, trade patterns,
and financial factors.
The research is contributing to our understanding of the workings of the
world oil market and of the likely effects of various national policies.
Results include forecasts of likely future price paths, studies of possible
causes of cartel instability, evaluation of various consumer and producer
country policies, and study of likely trade patterns in oil and their
implications for national security and international finance.
1. iNTRODUCTiON
The World Oil Project is being carried out by the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory
in association with the Sloan School of lanr-ageent and the Department of
Economics. The work was initiated in Summer 1973, with seed money from the
M.I.T. Energy Laboratory. Beginning in March 1975, the project received
support from the National Science Foundation. The original grant request was
for a 3-year period. Funding was first granted for an 18-month period, March
1, 1975 to August 31, 1976. Later, a continuation proposal was approved,
providing support for the period September 1, 1976 through February 28, 1978.
Currently, the research is also being supported, in part, by the M.I.T. Center
for Energy Policy Research.
The work has been led by three co-princial investigators:
M.A. Adelman -- Professor of Economics,
Henry D. Jacoby -- Professor of Management and Director of the M.I.T.
Center for Energy Policy Research,
Robert S. Pindyck -- Associate Professor of Management.
Over the course of the project several other faculty and M.I.T. staff have
contributed to the work. Also, studentsplay a significant role in the
research; in the past three years 17 graduate students have been employed as
research assistants, for periods ranging from a semester to two years or more.
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2. REVIEW OF WORK TO DATE
Over the three years of the grant period the M.I.T. World Oil Project has
completed a considerable amount of research on the behavior of Bworld energy
demand, the analysis of the supply of oil in various regions of the world and
its response to price changes and changes in other variables, the behavior of
the OPEC cartel, and the implications of higher energy prices on world
financial markets. Also, through the integration of our analytical studies
into a large-scale simulation model, we are able to analyze the possible
future behavior of the world oil market. The output of the research has taken
the form, first, of a functioning simulation model, and second, a large number
of published and unpublished articles, books, working papers, and research
memoranda. The purpose of this review is to summarize the written material
that has come out of the Project, and to provide a guide to the reading and
interpretation of this material.
Many of the studies conducted under the aegis of this project were
motivated by our particular approach to the analysis of the world oil market.
It is therefore appropriate to begin our survey work to date with a brief
review of our framework of analysis. Next we will turn to the studies of
world energy demand conducted under this project, and the studies of world oil
supply, and to the simulation model that incorporates the results. Finally,
we will survey our work on cartel behavior, and on special studies of other
issues associated with the world oil market. Throughout we refer to the
published and unpublished reports and papers listed in Appendix A.
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2.1 Framework of Analysis
Our basic approach to the analysis of the world oil market is shown in
Figure 1. In addition to displaying the various analytical stLides conmucted
under this project, Figure 1 also serves as a simplified clow diagram of our
simulation model of the world oil market. (Simulations studies dcne early in
the Project, and which helped to d-fine our current approach, are discussed in
the work of Eckbo (8).)
The heart of this project is the set of supply and demand studies shown in
the middle of Figure 1. These studies are valuable in their own right in that
they help to improve our understanding of the effects of fundamental market
forces on energy demand and supply. In addition, these studies serve to
provide estimates of supply functions for price-taker suppliers and demand
functions for importers that are needed for our simulation model. Because
these studies served two functions, they often went beyond the level of
analysis that would have been sufficient simply to develop equations for the
simulation model.
The simulation model itself is designed to accept an anticipated or
assumed oil price trajectory, and to compute the resulting demands, supplies,
and other market characteristics over a particular simulation horizon. The
development of hypotheses about likely cartel pricing behavior represents
another area of research conducted as part of this project. Several
behavioral models of cartel pricing were developed, and the price hypotheses
themselves are represented by the cloud at the upper left of Figure 1. Note
that our behavioral models of the cartel represent only one means of
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generating price scenarios; price scenarios based on the analysis or judg.mnt
of others can also be tested using the simulation framework.
One might ask why we approach the analysis of the world oil market using
two separate types of models -- one to represent cartel behavior, and the
other a detailed simulation model of market supply and demand. The reason for
this division is largely analytical convenience. The determinants of import
demand and price-taker supply are complex, and to analyze the likely response
of the market to one or another price pattern, one needs a method that can
accept unwieldy functional relationships. This requirement leads to a
simulation framework for the overall analysis of market demand and supply
outside the cartel. The analysis of cartel behavior, however, involves
dynamic optimization calculations that are generally feasible (given limited
computer resources) only with simplified supply-demand relationships. The two
analyses feed on one another, however, as shown in Figure 1.
2.2 The Analysis and Simulation of World Energy Demand
One part of the World Oil Project has been a detailed econometric analysis
of the characteristics of energy demand in about 10 of the world's major
energy-consuming countries. It was our feeling that to understand world oil
demand one had to also understand the demand for other fuels, since these
fuels are competitive with each other. Thus, one of our objectives has been
to obtain a firm quantitative grasp on the characteristics of total energy
use, again on a sector-by-sector basis. In the case of the residential
sector, for example, this means understanding the role of energy as part of
total consumption expenditures, and understanding how energy might be
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substituted with other categories of expenditures in res-onse to price or
income changes. In the case of the industrial sector, this means better
understanding the role of energy as a factor of production, and the degree of
long-run substitutability between energy, capital, and labor.
Our analysis of world energy demand began with the development of an
extensive data base. This data base itself represents an important product
that has come our of our project; already our data are being used by several
research groups around the world (see Appendix C). We have gone out of our
way to organize and store the data in a manner that assures easy access by
other research groups. Many of these data are described in detail in a
"User's Guide" (19).
Econometric work on the residual and industrial sectors is largely
completed. Our analysis of the residential sector indicates elasticities to
consumer-level product prices that are larger (around -1.0 for total energy
use) than had been commonly assumed earlier. In addition, there seems to be
considerable potential for interfuel substitution, at least in the long-run.
Our analysis of the residential sector is described in a detailed working
paper (25).
Our work on the industrial sector also indicates that the total price
elasticity of the demand for energy is larger than had been previously
thought. We find, for example, that the price elasticity of total energy
demand in the industrial sector is around -0.8 in a 3-factor study such as
this (capital, labor, energy). Also, energy and capital are shown to be
substitutes. This is in contrast to other studies, with somewhat different
data bases, structure and assumptions, which indicate complimentary between
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energy and capital. These differences may be due in part to the likelihood of
our having picked up long-run rather than short-run elasticities through the
use of pooled international data. Our work on the industrial sector is also
summarized in a detailed working paper (26).
Work oCl the transportation sector is so far limited to the demand for
motor gasoline. Here we have formulated a model that describes the total
stock of automobiles, the average number of miles driven per year for each
automobile, and the average fuel efficiency. Analyzing gasoline demand in
this way will allow us to introduce and test different dynamic adjustments for
*each of the three component variables. Our work on estimating functions for
gasoline demand is well under way, and preliminary results are available.
Documentation of the initial stages of this work is now being drafted.
We have used some rather crude econometric models (largely logarithmic
models with Koyck lag adjustments) to model the demands for petroleum products
in other sectors, and to model the demands for all petroleum products in
countries that consume smaller amounts of energy and that, because of data
limitations, have not been included in our detailed analyses. Although our
econometric approach has been somewhat simpler, we find that in many cases we
can obtain fairly robust estimates for price and income elasticities of
demand. Once again, we find price elasticities that are somewhat larger than
had been previously assumed, and we attribute this to the use of pooled
international data to capture long-run effects. This econometric work will
also be documented shortly. In addition, all of our econometric work on
energy demand will be described in detail in a forthcoming monograph by
Pindyck, to be completed in Summer, 1978.
-7-
In carrying out a demand simulation, we need a framework for calculating
consumer product prices as well as the relationship of demand to those
prices. We therefore had to develop a model that translates exogenous Persian
Gulf crude oil prices for particular products in particular countries. In
developing this model, ve have assumed that transport, refining, and marketing
costs will increase mildly, in real terms, by 1980, and will be constant
thereafter. In the existing model, consumer taxes may be held constant, or
may be assumed to vary under alternative sets of changing tax rules. Non-tax
restraints on demand are not yet a part of the model, but might be
approximated by the appropriate tax simulations. The description of this part
of the demand simulation model is presented in a forthcoming working paper.
The equation structure of the demand simulation as of March 1, 1978 is
shown in Figure 2. As the figure indicates, the current model is based on the
results of the detailed (translog) econometric work on residential and
industrial demand in the major consuming countries. (Data problems in Japan
and Belgium lead to the only exceptions here.) Likewise, oil demand estimates
for the transport and "other" sectors have been implemented for the big
consumers. During April 1978, individual 4-sector demand models will be
implemented for another six Western European countries.
Experience with demand estimation for LDC's has been disappointing, due
largely to the paucity of reliable data. Various methods have been tried, but
at present these countries (which represent less than 20% of world demand) are
handled in a highly simplified manner, as indicated in Figure 2.
There are several high-priority items for future research on demand
estimation and simulation. Experience with the model to date has shown the
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"other" category to present the bigest difficulties. Thee major problem is an
unfinished item of business from the most recent grant period -- i.e., the
electric power sector. In future work e hope to develop a fuel-choice model
for electric power -- one that takes account of the unique influence of
nuclear energy and the role of government policies -- and re-estimate an
"other" category net of electric power production.
Another priority task is to improve the existing model of gasoline demand
in the U.S. and other industrial countries. Much of the estimation work is
completed, but work remains to be done to implement, test, verify (and perhaps
re-estimate) until the best equation structure and parameters have been
determined. The quantities are large in this sector, and even minor
improvements in accuracy are significant.
As a result of our exhaustive work on the residential and industrial
sectors, we have considerable confidence in our estimates of long-run
elasticities. However, important research remains to be done to better
understand the lag structure -- i.e., the time it takes to realize the
adjustments implicit in long-run elasticities. There are improvements to be
had as well in the estimation of oil demand by some of the larger LDC's (e.g.,
Brazil and India) and more data gathering and analysis is justified. Also,
special attention needs to be devoted to the oil exporting LDC's, whose demand
is small but growing at a very high rate.
2.3 Analysis and Simulation of World Oil Supply
Petroleum exporters need to be grouped into two rough categories. First,
there are what we will call "price-taker" suppliers. This is a group of
-9-
petroleum exporters who appear to at as rice-takers in the sense tat each
takes the world price (which is being set by others) as given, and akes
supply decisions accordingly. This group includes non-OPEC sources such as
the orth Sea, the USSR, China, and .exico, and may also include some mer,-.iers
of OPEC ho have low per-capita incomes, such as Algeria. Indonesia, and
Nigeria. Second, there is the "cartel core" -- a small group of nations who
are the price-makers. This core includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others on
the Arabian Peninsula; it also may include Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Venezuela.
These countries face a residual demand for world oil, which is the total
demand less that supplied by the price-taker exporters. These groupings are
not hard and fast; indeed, a major focus of our inquiry is the circumstance in
which a given exporter would change from one to another camp.
We have used several methods to analyze oil production capacity and
supply. The two principal ones are shown in Figure 3; they are described in
some detail, and compared, in a paper by Adelman and Jacoby (2). The
Disaggregated Pool Analysis felt to be the more accurate of the two. It is
discussed in detail in a paper by Eckbo, Jacoby and Smith (6), and background
research is presented in projecting working papers (18, 20, 26). Thus far the
disaggregated method has been applied to the North Sea (5, 6), and analytical
results have been applied in discussion of development policy questions in the
area (7, 9). The disaggregated method is costly in terms of its requirements
in data, expert geological judgment, and computation, time and money. Work
will continue on this method, but over the next year or two it will be
applied, at most, to one or two of the most important areas of the world.
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In order to grin LIorld.Seide coverqe, Ae h.ve developed another method, t'e
Aggregated Country Analysis (2), which can be carried throuigh for all areas cf
the orld based on data available in the public domain. The method proceeds
as follows: For each of 39 producing areas, wae calculate the average new
proved reserves and capacity brought on by a rig-year (one rig operating per
year) during 172-75. As new proved reserves are impounded from the country's
"ultimate" reserves (estimated mostly from the open literature, but drawing
also in some private information) successive rig-years bring less new capacity
-- unless the "ultimate" reserves are revised upward. The model registers
discoveries, and allows for their effects, but does not forecast them. The
resulting investment level and ultimate output, given a forecast of the
drilling rate, is only weakly responsive to price, at least given our current
cost functions.
Work is under way to develop methods of forecasting the response of
drilling to price, but at present the drilling scenarios are exogenous. The
introduction of endogenous functions must be done with care, for price
increases do not necessarily generate additional drilling, and may often
discourage it. In private-enterprise countries the government may take more
than the incremental revenue; hence, despite the higher market price, the
price as perceived by the operating company need not increase and may even
decrease. Where the oil industry is government owned, higher revenues may
suffice for all commitments and spending plans and dull the perceived need for
additional reserves and production. A better explanatory variable than price
may be "financial health." Accumulated foreign assets and good credit rating
shield a government from the need to cut prices for higher short-term
-11-
revenues, or to invest in oil development for higher long-term revenues.
Perverse price effects have been discerned in Canada, Norway, and the U.K.;
Libya and Venezuela (perhaps considered "core" countries); and in Indonesia
and Malaysia. An important change in exican policy seems explicable by its
heavy debt.
Since the current model is basically inertial, projecting recent
tendencies, it must be frequently updated, country by country; if possible,
field by field. As the work proceeds, we will introduce functional relations
for drilling rates for those countries that may prove responsive to price.
Based on the experience to date, we believe the approach represented by
the two models in Figure 3 are a very fertile area for further research, data
gathering, and model development. The pay-off is in four areas:
* Improved data for the aggregate model -- including
better analysis of drilling rates and associated costs,
more analysis of the influence of tax systems and other
producer government policies, and better estimates of
ultimate recoverable reserves.
a Adjustment of the aggregate model using insights and
functions developed in the research on the disaggregated
model -- essentially developing a hybrid that captures
the importance of geology and engineering cost, as does
the disaggregated model, but still requires only data
that are readily available for most areas of the world.
* Further development of the disaggregated model itself,
as a new and very useful analytic tool.
* Study of the influences on producer government policy --
particularly financial burdens and balance of payments
problems.
2.4 Models of Cartel Behavior
We have conducted a number of studies of the structure of the OPEC cartel
and its implications for the pricing of oil over the next two or three
-! l -
decades. In these steadies, the cartel is tr an ecc a::nic unit. Tl re
are, of course, constraints within the cartel slowing down or blocking
evolution, and also from outside macroecnomic or political factors. The
importance of these behavioral ?cels is tat tey show the ultimate
tendencies of the ealth-maximizint goup.
This work has largely involved the application of nonlinear optimal
control algorithms to several small and somew!hat simplified models of the
world oil market and the OPEC cartel. For example, in one study we treated
OPEC as a unified monopoly that shared all production cutbacks evenly (4,12).
We tried to determine the price trajectory for oil that would be optimal for
this cartel, i.e., that would maximize the sum of present and future
discounted revenues. This optimization was subject to the constraints of a
simple model of the world oil market, in which the total demand for oil was a
dynamic function of price and income, the supply of non-cartel oil was a
function of price as well as resource depletion, and where OPEC's production
costs would rise as its reserves were depleted. Later, this approach was
applied to other cartels, including CIPEC (the copper cartel) and IBA (the
International Bauxite Association) (14, 15).
We also extended our model of OPEC to account for the fact that there are
countries within the cartel that operate under different constraints and that
may have somewhat different objectives (10). In particular, we divided the
cartel into two groups of countries. "Saver" countries were those that had
very large reserves of oil and very little immediate need for cash, so that
they would use a small discount rate in determining the present value of their
oil revenues. "Spender" countries, on the other hand, have a higher immediate
-13-
need for cash, and also enjoy mjuch greater resrves. We found that this
division of the cartel leads to a clear-cut conflict in objectives, but that
Nash bargaining theory could be used as a way of determining potential
resolution to that conflict. Nash solutions call for not only an optimal
price trajectory, but also an otimc' division of cartel output, and in
particular call for the "saver" countries to do most of the cutting back
initially.
In addition to this, we have also been looking at some fundamental
questions in the economies of resource exploration and production. In
particular, we have examined the problem of the interrelationship between the
optimal rate of nonrenewable resource exploration and the optimal rate of
resource production. One of the problems with our earlier cartel studies is
that they ignored reserve accumulation resulting from new exploration, and
progress has been made in introducing this important influence (12)..
Much of our work on optimal cartel behavior was done during the first 18
months of the project. Though research on these issues has continued through
the 18-month continuation period, the resources committed to this area have
not been great -- the major new contributions being the introduction of
exploration into the models, and the extension to minerals besides oil. Work
is under way on the integration of the cartel behavioral analysis with the
simulation framework, but full communication between the two models has not
yet been achieved. The missing link is the use of the simulation framework to
generate simplified supply and demand functions for the analytical models of
cartel pricing, and the attainment of convergent solutions. This link-up
remains a high-priority item of research.
-14-
Also, there are useful extensions of the cartel models theirselves that are
yet to be achieved. These include further work on the role of explor-ation
(12), the introduction of financial variables in the supply equation, and
possible extensions to cartels of more than two arts.
2.5 Simulation Model
As noted in Section 1, we have developed a simulation model which
incorporates the demand and supply work discussed above, and makes use of
insights into OPEC behavior drawn from continuing studies of the behavior of
the cartel core. The overall simulation apparatus consists of three parts:
e A demand simulator, which includes a set of price
determination routines, and which computes worldwide
demand using the equation structure summarized in
Figure 2.
* A supply simulator, which implements the aggregate model
of oil supply, summarized in the left side of Figure 3.
e An integration package which computes supply-demand
balances, and analyzes the allocation of excess capacity
within the cartel core.
The simulation program is written in the computer language TROLL, with the
supply analysis being written in FORTRAN and imbedded in the TROLL structure.
User's guides to the overall simulation package, and to various supporting
programs are in draft.
The large-scale simulation model has gone through several stages. It was
first completed and used for analysis in July 1977, a Phase II version was
completed in October 1977, and further modifications were incorporated into a
Phase III version which constitutes the operating program as of February 1978.
-15-
A sample of the siinulation output is shovn1 in Figure 4. Assumptions
behind this particular calculation are shown at the bottom of the figure. In
addition, consumer taxes are held constant in the sample results sho..n here.
Note that any scenario is only valid up to the point where demand rises
near to capacity -- not beyond. If de-mand exceeds the anJnt supplied, or if
it is expected to, prices will rise in advance of the "crosscver," with a
feedback effect upon demand, probably magnified through effects on the world
trading and money system. Thus the results shown in Figure 4 lead to
subsequent stages of analysis for clearly the crossover point shown in the
figure cannot be reached. Some years before the excess capacity actually
dried up, the oil price would begin to rise -- perhaps outside the cartel's
control. The effect of such a price change (and in this example we show only
one of several possible hypotheses about what might happen to price) is shown
in Figure 5. First, the effect, given continuous healthy economic growth, is
shown. Second, the figure shows the results of a hypothesis of serious
worldwide recession being precipitated by a sudden price increase of the
magnitude assumed in Figure 5.
The serious economic and political implications of the picture shown in
Figure 5 raises doubts that such an event would actually be allowed to happen,
and leads to subsequent stages in analysis. The logical next step (not shown
here) is to look further into the role of expectations of future price
problems, and the likelihood of a gradually rising price through the 1980's,
perhaps with a retardant effect on worldwide economic growth. Note that the
figures shown here are based on preliminary model results, and are intended
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only to deimonstrate the current status of the models and analysis. These
figures may change as data development and analysis proceed. Also, here we do
not explicitly consider any divergent conduct or frictions within the cartel,
which has been successful so far but with much tension.
There are more improvements that should be made to the sim ulation
framework. First and foremost, the model must be corrected, and rechecked and
calibrated, each time some results are incorporated from the demand and supply
estimation work. The structure of the overall simulation has been made highly
modular to make this process as painless as possible. Also, as the model
begins to be used for analysis by groups outside the Project, the users are
requesting features that were not in the original model design. (As an
example, an early outside request was for simulations involving complex
variations in GNP growth rates between countries and over time, whereas the
original design allowed only a single growth rate for each country.).
Thus far, these minor changes have been accommodated without great
difficulty. In addition, there are other improvements that are worth making,
even with the current demand and supply modules:
* More flexible means of handling consumer tax policies,
by product and by country.
* More flexible assumptions regarding drilling rates in
the aggregate supply model.
* Changes in the year-to-year supply/demand balance, to
allow more flexible cartel allocation hypotheses, and
pricing algorithms.
Also, the closer integration with the analytic models of cartel behavior is a
priority area for additional research.
-17-
2.6 Special Studies
2.6 1 Contract rrancements and Trade Patterns
Work continues on the monitorin of Pveo ' nts in the oi m arket. The
results of this survey and study activity are reflected in a nurTmber of the
models (particularly the work on supply (2, 5) and cartel behavior (12), and
in the various papers that discuss market structure and performance and
related policy issues (1, 13). However, we have not written papers dedicated
exclusively to the details of day-to-day market evolution.
Continuing study of this area is an essential component of further work on
the world oil market.
2.6.2 Financial Aspects of the Oil Market
We have done a number of studies of the financial aspects of the world oil
market and its evolution over time. This work began with the gathering and
analysis of some key data on financial markets (17). Related efforts explored
the phenomena of primary and secondary recycling of oil funds (16, 3). Due to
limitations on project resources, the work on financial aspects has, so far,
been a small part of our overall activity. However, one important result of
this work has been a clearer understanding of international financial markets
as they are impacted by oil deficits, and the important role played by
adjustments in good markets (i.e., adjustments in the balance of trade) in the
worldwide equilibrating mechanism. A good deal of our work in this area is
brought together in a paper by Agmon, Lessard and Paddock (3).
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2.6.3 Transort and Ouality Differentials and Refiner Margins
Considerable data gathering and analysis has been completed on these costs
and margins. The results are used in the simulation model to calculate export
prices for crude oil and product prices to consumers (see Figure 1)..
Documentation of this work, and the results, are contained in a forthcoming
working paper.
2.6.4 Extension to Other Resources
The formal analysis of cartel behavior has been extended to other minerals
(14, 15), but Project funds devoted to these extensions during the past year
have been small. Based on experience to date, the most productive extension
to other resources would be to incorporate more explicit analysis of the
suppplies, demands, and markets for LNG and steam coal, which are closely
related to the oil market.
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3. APPLICATIONS TO POLICY ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS
We feel that our work is readily applicable to a number of important
policy questions. For this reason, we are now beginning to use some of our
results as a basis for the analysis of particular policy programs. We expect
that this work will result in published papers on policy (1, 13), as well as
analyses performed in response to the requests of government agencies and
Congressional committees. Other policy-oriented papers are now in draft.
In addition, we are developing the documentation necessary to make our
data bases and models available to other research groups and to government
agencies. As mentioned earlier, we are preparing detailed and comprehensive
documentation for our world energy demand data base (19). Appendix B shows
the research groups who are already making use of this data resource. In
addition, we are developing documentation that will enable other groups to use
our simulation models.
Dissemination of results also takes place through the involvement of
project leaders and members in professional meetings, by the giving of
seminars, lectures and testimony, and through participation in conferences on
international energy issues. In addition, project members are in working
contact with many groups who are working on oil issues, who are sources of
data and assistance, or who are clients for results. A list of these cn-
tacts over the grant period is provided as Appendix B.
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Publications and Working Papers frc . the M.I.T. World OCil Proect
PUBLICATIONS
1. Adelman, M.A., "Producers, Consumiers, and Multinationals: Problems in
Analyzing a Non-Competitive Market", October 1977. Originally released as
Working Paper MIT-- 77-038WP, a revised version of this paper appeared as:
"Constraints on the World Oil Monopoly Price," esources and Energy, Vol. 1,
No. 1. 1978. A sur.nary appears in Petroleum Ecncrnist, September 1977.
The consuming nations have the power to damage or wreck the world oil
monopoly, but prefer cooperation because of their fixed belief that
otherwise the market will fail to clear and generate a "gap." Yet they
may use the power inadvertently. The monopoly acts essentially as a
loose cartel, with a safety net: a large seller (Saudi Arabia) would,
if need be, act as the restrictor of last resort. But this would
maximize Saudi profits at a much lower price, penalizing the
other sellers. The conflict can be held off by ad hoc agreements while
raising the price. But the risk of conflict and highly uncertain long
run demand and supply make it likely that the cartel will only slowly
and gradually approach profitor wealth-maximization. "Political
objectives" coincide with economic and can be neglected.
2. Adelman, M.A., and H.D. Jacoby, "Alternative Methods of Oil Supply
Forecasting", in R.S. Pindyck (ed.), Advances in the Economics of Energy
Resources, Vol. 11, J.A.I. Press, 1979. Originally distributed as Working
Paper MIT-EL-77-023WP.
Analysis of likely developments in the world oil market is ultimately
dependent on some method of forecasting oil supply from key regions.
Unfortunately, data problems tend to dominate work in this area, and
much of the analysis task reduces to making the best use of the limited
information that is available. Here we report on two alternative
approaches to this forecasting problem, both avowedly data-oriented.
Petroleum exporters need to be grouped into two rough categories.
First, there are what we call price-taker suppliers. Second, there is
the "cartel core"--a small group-of nations who are the price-makers.
Their groupings are not hard and fast; indeed an exporter would change
from one to another camp.
In this paper our focus is on the price-takers. Our analysis seeks an
understanding of the fundamental market forces, and to provide
estimates of supply functions for price-taker suppliers and demand
functions for importers. These functions are to be incorporated into a
simulation model of overall market performance.
A-1
3. Agmon, T. , D.R. Lessard, and J.L. Paddock, "Financial Markets and the
Adjustment to Higher Oil Prices", in R. S. Pindyck (ed.) Advances n the
Economics of Ererev and Res:ources, 'olnum!e I, J.A.I. Press, Greenwich, Conn.,
fort 'mi na. Originally dstributed as orkirg Paper T -EL 77-0G39WP
This paper explores the linkages between the world energy and financial
markets. The role of international financial markets in the adjustment
of the real markets for energy is analyzed from both a conceptual and
tEipirical viewpoint. Financial internediation is found to be an
important accomm !odation rmechanism in the market-clearing behavior of
price and quantity. Finally we look at the portfolio aspects of
producers' "surpl s funds," and the implications of stress for world
financial market.
4. Cremer, J. and M.L. Weitzman, "OPEC and the .4onopoly Price of World oil",
European Economic Review, Vol. 8, 1976, pp. 1555-164. Originally
distributed as Working Paper MIT-EL 76-015WP.
This paper presents a dynamic model of the behavior of OPEC viewed as
monopolist sharing the world oil market with a competitive sector. The
main conclusion is that the recent increase in the price of oil was a
once-and-for-all phenomenon due to the formation of the cartel. The
model form used here indicates that real oil prices should remain
approximately constant over the next twenty years.
5. Eckbo, P.L., "A Basin Development Model of Oil Supply," in R.S. Pindyck,
(ed.) Advances in the Economics of Energy and Resources, Vol. II, J.A.I.
Press, Greenwich, Conn., forthcoming.
The paper describes a procedure for estimating the supply potential of
a region given an exogenously specified time profile for exploratory
drilling. The procedure involves analysis of the exploration for
finding development, and production of reservoirs. The Basin
Development Model relies on a deterministic discovery decline
relationship to generate an expected discovery sequence. This
discovery decline relationship serves as a first approximation to the
joint analysis of the exploration for plays and reservoirs inside a
play. The reservoirs found enter into a reservoir model which takes
account of costs and expected future prices, and allows detailed
consideration of the tax regime. By separating exploration and finding
activities from development and production activities, the Basin
Development Model allows consideration of the two major aspects of
resource depletion, the depletion of producible reservoirs from the
population of reservoirs to be found, and the depletion of recoverable
reserves from the existing population of producible reservoirs. The
price elasticity of the level of ultimate recoverable reserves falls
out of the interaction between the exploration and reservoir analysis
as demonstrated in the paper.
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6. Eckbo, P. L., D. Jac oby, and J.L. i th, "Oil A;pnly Forecasting: 
D isaggrcgated Process Approach," FBell Journal of conorics, Spring 1978.
Oriinally d stributed as orkirng Paper Mi'T-EL 77-001 
Work is under way on a forecasting method that inco-rporates explicit
representations o. the steps in the oil supply procZs: expcrC ation,
reservoir deveo .. nt, and production. The discovery history of a
region and other geological data are input to a statistical analysis of
the exploratory process. The resulting estimate of the size
dist ribution of new eservoirs is combined with an ev al ation of
reservoir ecoro.2.ic--takring: account of engineering cost, oil price, and
taxes. The modl rduces a forecast of additions to the productive
reserve "ase rnd of oil sul y. Progress to date is demonstrated in an
application to te NJo th Sea .
7. Eckbo, P.L., "Planning and Regulation in the North Sea", Northern Offshore,
No. 9, September 1976.
This article discusses the impact on North Sea exploration, production,
and reserve levels of Norwegian Government block-allocation and tax
policies.
8. Eckbo, P.L., The Future of World Oil, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976.
Originally distributed as Working Paper MIT-EL 75-017WP.
This paper describes a behavioral model of the international petroleum
market and presents the results from it. The purpose of the study is
to develop a framework for analysis of the implications of
non-canpetitive behavior in the international petroleum market. The
focus is on the market strategies that may be pursued by the world' s
oil exporters on a joint or an individual basis. The structure of the
model is designed to combine features of formal modeling and of
informal "story-telling" in a consistent framework. Such a structure
requires a simulation type model.
The "stories" that are being told are constructed from cartel theory,
from the empirical evidence on previous commodity cartels and from the
special characteristics of the individual oil exporters. The model is
evolutionary in the sense that each exporter is assumed to behave
according to a set of decision rules which may reflect a competitive
market structure, a monopolistic market structure or any combination of
the two. Changes in the decisions rules being applied provides for the
evolution of the market price. An attempt has been made to combine
formal competitive and monopoly models with those of the informal
story-telling approach.
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9. Eckbo, P.L., and J.L. Smith, '!:Jee d rExploraton tivt5 r',b r- o: y ,
Northern Offshore, Atrust 1976.
This article anal yes the in:a-, es et,' er, North SC.--a FEict: allcc ions
and their effect on future pro:uction. A statst ical model is
developed to explore the ethodolo by hich 'Norway influences
attainment of its target production rate by all cating b o- ks to
producers.
10. Hnvilicza, E. and R. S. Pindyck, "Pricing Policies For A Two-Part Exh!stilble
Resource Cartel: The Case of OPEC", uroc--an Economic Review, 'ol,8, 1976,
pp.139-154. Originally distributed as 'Working Paper iT1-E L-75-DO,, P
This paper expTines pricing policies for OPEC under he assnption that
the cartel is conposed of a block of spender countries with large cash
needs and a block of saver countries with little i-rneiate need for
cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the
two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the
optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory
of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining
points--and the corresponding Nash solution--is computed under two
assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to
choice and that they are fixed at historical values. The results
suggest that, for fixed output shares, there is little room for
bargaining and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price
path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend
significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.
11. Jacoby, H.D., "M.I.T. World Oil Project", in K.C. Hoffman (ed.), Proceedings
of the Workshop on World Oil Supply-Demand Analysis (June 1-2,
1977),Brookhaven National Laboratory, forthcoming.
A description of the structure of the project, methods being used, and
problems of data and analysis.
12. Pindyck, R.S. "Optimal Exploration and Production of a Nonrenewable
Resource", Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. Originally
distributed as Working Paper MIT-EL-77-013WP.
Most studies of nonrenewable resource production and pricing assume
there is a fixed reserve base to be exploited over time, but in fact
with economic incentives reserves can be increased. Here we treat the
reserve base as the basis for production, and exploratory activity as
the means of increasing or maintaining reserves. "Potential reserves"
are unlimited, but as depletion ensues, given amounts of exploratory
activity result in even smaller discoveries. Given these constraints,
resource producers must simultaneously determine their optimal rates of
exploratory activity and production. We solve this problem for
competitive and monopolistic markets, and show that if the initial
reserve eridcer,ont is small, the pr p of it will be 11-hr--ied; at first
production will increase as reserves are developed, and later
production will :cline as both exploratory activity and the dscovery
rate fall.
13. Pirndyck, R.S., "O(ECC's nreat to the West", Foreign Policy, Spring 1978.
Originally distributed as ';orking Paper ?-T-EL-? 8-O 1 l1P.
This paper ex amines three imprtant issues in international energy
markets, and the impl-ications for -,erican energy and econcaic policy.
First, the paper condcers the likely pricing be'hvior of the (PC
cartel, and argues tha OPEC is most likely to set the price of oil at
the optimal level, i.e., the level that maximizes the sum of present
and future discounted revenues. Somane predictions regarding OPEC
pricing are offered, and the implications for world energy markets are
considered. We argue that the kind of crisis that has been of concern
to the CIA, namely a major shortage of oil beginning around 1982, is
extremely unlilkely to occur, and instead we need to be more concerned
with the possibility of an embargo in the short term. Finally, the
implications of higher energy prices for GNP growth, unemployment, and
inflation in the industrialized countries is discussed. The paper
concludes with a set of energy and economic policy recomrnendations.
14. Pindyck, R.S., "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible
Resources", The Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1978. Originally
distributed as Working Paper MIT-EL-76-012WP.
The potential gains to producers from the cartelization of the world
petroleum, copper and bauxite markets are calculated under the
assumption of optimal dynamic monopoly pricing of an exhaustible
resource. Small quantitative models for the markets for each resource
are developed that account for short-term resource are measured by
calculating optimal price trajectories under competition and under
cartelization, and comparing the sumns of discounted profits resulting
from each.
15. Pindyck, R.S., "Cartel Pricing and the Structure of the World Bauxite
Market", March 1977, Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1977. Originally
distributed as Working Paper MIT-EL-77-005WP.
A cartel is unstable if one or more of its members can earn higher
revenues in the long run by undercutting the cartel price and expanding
production. In this paper dynamic and static models of the world
bauxite market are used to assess the stability of the International
Bauxite Association, to suggest possible changes in its configuration,
and to determine the likely impact of the cartel on the structure of
the bauxite market and the future of bauxite prices.
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WORKT!JG PAPEPS AID REPORTS
16. Agmon, T, D. R. Lessard and J. L. Paddock, "Accommodation in International
Capital -arkets: Paving for Oil, Financing Oil and the Recycling of Oil
Funds", IT-EL-76-OiOWP, April 1976.
This paper focuses on the accommod at' on role served by the
international financial markets in facilitating world oil market
equilibration. We analyze the secific roles of primary and secondary
recycling of oil funds in the international adjustment process. An
extensive empirical study is then conducted using data for 1973, 1974,
and early 1975. This study reveals the magnitudes and important
interrelationships between flows in the markets for goods and financial
assets. We conclude with a general equilibrium model which derives the
supply behavior of an oil-producing country.
17. Agmon, T., D.R. Lessard and J.L. Paddock, "The International Finance Aspects
of OPEC: An Informational Note", MIT-EL-76-005WP, March 1976.
The purpose of this paper is to set forth the relevant questions and
problems confronted by the world's capital markets due to the
structural changes in the world oil market. It presents a sunmary
description of several financial aspects of OPEC, including the
organization of relevant information and data into a form useful for
subsequent analysis. A brief analysis of this information is included,
but the main purpose is to collect and present the information in a
systematic way, including sources.
First, it presents an analysis of the many forecasts of OPEC
accumulated financial surpluses and their estimated investment
disposition--with particular focus on the U.S., U.K., and Euromarkets.
There follows a brief discussion and extensive source listing of the
various financial proposals which arose to deal with these financial
surpluses. Concluding sections present a chronology of the major
international financial events which led up to the 1973 price rise and
thereafter, and a summary of the subsequent changes in U.S. corporate
tax policy.
18. Beall, A.O., "Dynamics of Petroleum Industry Investment in the North Sea",
MIT-EL-76-007WP, June 1976.
The purpose of this study is to assess the economic potential of
petroleum fields of the North Sea, as reflected in financial flows to
the operating companies and host governments. Financial flows include
future streams of exploration and development investment expenditures,
and sales and tax revenues which accrue in the private and public
sectors.
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A prereouisite for the economic analysis is an cva] tuntion of current
petroleum potential of prospective orth ea Acreage, condl:cted t a
di sag rergted (cl) '-ve . This art of the study relies ihcvily on
geological insight and ,ujdgemental analysis provided by the aur, 2.s
well as on published information and formal analtcal methods.
The level of cash flows associated with the estimated resource
potential is shown to depend on host government tax and irve:t cnt
po'icies, the world price of crude oil and current industry perceptions
of the profitability of individual fields.
19. Carson, J., "A User's Guide to the World Oil Project Demand Data BEase",
MIT-EL-78-O16WIP, due, August 1978.
A description of all the data used for demand analysis in the 'world Oil
Project. Cites sources used, range of years available, and provides a
description of all conversions, aggregations, and other standardization
of units. An index of computerized data files, information on how to
access the computerized data or obtain the information in other formats
included. Purchasing power parities and issues involving energy unit
conversion are discussed.
20. Crandall, M.S., "The Economics of Iranian Oil", MIT-EL-73-03WP, March,
1975.
This paper presents an analysis of the production pattern and
development cost structure of the Iranian "Consortium" oil fields.
Production capacity of existing fields under alternative development
technologies (e.g., water and gas injection systems) is analyzed first.
This includes capacity maintenance and growth plans. The paper then
presents a comparative cost study for these fields and derives
per-barrel capital costs and present worth of each field.
Next the paper reviews Iran's potential new fields and performs a
similar production/cost study based on the published series of "Look
Ahead and Capital Development Plans" through 1978 as issued by both the
Iranian government (through its National Iranian Oil Company) and the
Oil Service Company of Iran (OSCO - a private company owned by the
former Consortium companies).
21. Eckbo, P.L., "The Supply of North Sea Oil", MIT-EL-77-015WP, July, 1977.
This paper discusses reserves and production estimates for oil
reservoirs in the North Sea already in the production or development
stage, for reservoirs recently discovered and likely to enter the
development stage, as well as for reservoirs likely to be discovered.
The statistical version of a disaggregated process model is used to
analyze "drilling up" scenarios for the North sea. the significance of
A-7
the tail of the discovery decline curve en analyzing the long-term
elasticity of oil supply with respect to price is thereby dcm;onstrateJ.
22. Eckbo, P.L., "'OPEC and the Experience of Previous International Commoity
Cartels", 7!T-EL-75-0ODSWP, August, 1975.
This study presents a review and analysis of the available literature
of the history of internationnal comrn-godity cartels. Evidence was
gathered on 51 cartel agreements in 18 industries. Cartel "success"
was defined in ternns of the ability of the organization to raise the
price to at least two times the unit cost of production and
distribution. Of the 51 cartel organizations reported in the
literature, 19 achieved price controls hich raised the level of
charges to consumers significantly above what they would have been in
the absence of collusive agreements.
The experience of these previous cartels shows that few were able to
survive for very long. Those who did succeed in raising prices for
four years or more were characterized by markets where the
concentration of production was high, the demands inelastic, the
cartels market share was high and the membership had cost advantages
over outsiders. In addition a characteristic of the successful cartels
was that governments were not directly involved in their operations.
The paper attempts to draw conclusions about the future of OPEC based
on its characteristics in comparison to those of successful and
unsuccessful cartels in the past.
23. Members of the M.I.T. World Oil Project, "Progress on Analysis of-the World
Oil Market," MIT-EL-75-015WP, October, 1975.
This is the 6-month report on the Project. It presents an overview of
the research design and the details of work in progress as of Fall
1975, including the demand analysis, the supply studies, and the
various studies of market-clearing processes. It also includes a
revised version of the work schedule presented in the original
proposal.
24. Pindyck, R.S., "Interfuel Substitution and the Industrial Demand for Energy:
An International Ccmparison", "review of Econcmics and Statistics", May,
1977. MIT-El-77-026WP, August, 1977.
This paper describes the specification and estimation of some
alternative models of energy demand for the industrial sectors of a
number of industrialized countries. All of the models are based on a
two-stage determination of energy expenditures. The first stage of
each model determines the fraction of the cost of production allocated
to energy, as opposed to other factor inputs such as capital and labor.
In the second stage, energy expenditures are allocated to different
fuels.
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The most promising results ca-ne from the use of a ;,'-.ctae translog
cost function as a escription of the rrcu, t oin process. The
advantage of this translog funct i ion is that it is a general
approximation to ar-y cost unction, and t-er -fore does not a rJori
impose constaints of ho-n e .ticty,. or earajL! sr. the stru-cture of
production. These functions were estim-ted usirn po oled dta for 10
countries. Other models, includ 'ing static and d'.amic logic r oels,
were also tested. Results from this study seem to indicate- that price
elasticities for industrial energy demand are larger than had been
t.hought earlier, and that in the Iong run there may be substitutability
between energy and capital. The o.m rice elasticity for total
industrial energy dand was estimated to be bout -0.8.
25. Pindyck, R. S., "International Comparisons of the Residential Derrmand for
Energy", MIT-EL-77-O2-1WP, August, 1977. This is an updated version of
MIT-EL-76-92 3WP.
This paper describes alternative models of energy demand in the
residential sectors of a number of industrial countries. The models
are based on a two-stage determination of energy expenditures. the
first stage of each model determines what fraction of consumers' total
budgets will be spent on energy, as opposed to such other consumption
.categorieis as food, clothing, etc. In the second stage, energy
expenditures are allocated to alternative fuels.
The most promising results came from the use of a two stage indirect
translog utility function. The advantge of the translog function is
that it is a general approxifm-tOt. to any utility function and
therefore does not a priori impose constraints of homotheticity,
separability, or additivity on the structure of demand. These
functions were estimated using pooled data for nine countries. Other
models, including the logit model, were also tested. Results from this
study seem to indicate that price elasticities for energy demand are
larger than had been thought earlier. The own price elasticity for
total energy demand was estimated to be about -.9.
26. Supply Working Group, M.I.T. World Oil Project, "Supply Forecasting Using
Disaggregated Pool Analysis", MIT-EL-76-009WP, May, 1976.
This study develops and illustrates a methodology for forecasting
additions to reserves and production in a relatively young petroleum
province. Components of the analytical method include an exploration
process submodel which predicts the arrival and size of new discoveries
and a reservior development submodel which determines the rate at which
discovered resources become available as economic reserves.
Both submodels emphasize the influence which economic variables such as
oil price, development costs, and government taxes exert on the rate
and pattern of resource exploitation. Consequently, the analytical
framework neatly accommodates policy simulations which arise from
varied economic scenarios.
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Imnpleme:ltation of the forecast :r ethodology is demonrstrated for the
North Sea petroleum Frovince. Froject-on of future additions to
reserves and annual .rodur:tiol are carried cut in detail, so as to
reveal both the fle.: bility and the limitat.ions of the aralytical
procedure in its present form.
.:.. :· . '~ ·;',.-' ·
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Appendix B
LIST OF EETINGS, LECTUPES, CONFER;CES, AND TESTIMONY
Date____ Description
Mar--h 1975 Testimony before the Joint Economic CoiLittee on
"The FEA's Project Independence Report," by
M.A. Ademan, H.D. Jacoby, and others of
the M.I.T. Policy Study Group.
Participation by M.A. Adelman at meeting on
oil and Middle-East policy, sponsored by
the Boston Council on Foreign Relations
Address on the oil market by M.A. Adelman to
State Department personnel.
April 1975 Participation by H.D. Jacoby and R.S. Pindyck
in NSF-sponsored conference on energy
modeling, held at Harvard University.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in the Annual
Petroleum Economics and Management
Conference, Northeastern University.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in symposium
on energy policy, Los Angeles Center for
Law in the Public Interest.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in symposium
on world and domestic oil, Salmon Brothers
(New York).
Presentation by M.A. Adelman of a paper on
Energy Markets and the Threat to World
Economic Order, Japan-U.S. Assembly.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in a Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Paying for
Energy (April to December).
Address by M.A. Adelman to the Fulbright Scholars
of Cambridge, on international oil and
cartel problems.
Address by M.A. Adelman on the economics of the
oil cartel, at Resources for the Future
(Washington, D.C.).
Drae s cri tion
April 1975 (Con't.)
gay 1975
Address by M.A. Ademinan on wor- enIercgy, to the
Amnerican Society of Nc:spa? r EBditors
(Washington, D.C.) .
Participation by M.A. Adelman and H.D. Jacoby
in a conference on "United States Energy
Policy--Analysis and Evaluation," sc.nsored
by the M.I.T. Club of South Texas, Houston,
Texas.
Testinony before the U.S. Senate Banking Ccr..Uittee
on support for development of energy substitutes,
by M.A. Adelman.
June 1975
July 1975
Participation by H.D. Jacoby in the ERDA/NSF
sponsored Seminar on International Energy
Analysis, Washington, D.C.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in a symposium on
energy and foreign policy, National War College.
Address by H.D. Jacoby on problems of the world
oil market, sponsored by the Bangladesh Energy
Study and the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Agency
(Dacca).
September 1975 Participation by H.D. Jacoby in seminar presented
to executives of the Gulf Oil Corporation,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Address by M.A. Adelman on cartel analysis, given
to the economic staff, Bell Telephone
Laboratories.
October 1975
November 1975
Address by M.A. Adelman on aspects of the world
oil market, Conference on New England and the
Energy Crisis sponsored by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston.
Participation by H.D. Jacoby in the Nuclear Fuel
Policy Working Group of the Atlantic Council
(ended April 1976).
Participation by H.D. Jacoby in the National
Petroleum Council, Committee on Future
Energy Prospects (ended November 1976).
Date
Der.cri.,t i. on
Noverber 1975 (Con't.) Participation by M.A. Adelman in a Conference on
World Petroleum, Salmon Brothers (iew York).
Presentation by T. Agmon, D. Lessard, and
J. Paddock on "Accorodation in International
Capital M'arkets: Paying for Oil, Financing
of Oil, and the Pr-cycling of Oil Funds,"
given at the International Trade and
IDevelc?;ent £emlnar, M.I.T. Economics
Dpa rtment .
December 1975 Presentation by M.A. Adelman of the David
Kinley Lecture, University of Illinois,
"Scarcity and Monopoly in the World Oil
Market."
Presentation by T.Agmon, D.Lessard, and J.
Paddock on "Investment Decisions of a
Country Endowed with an Exhaustible
Resource: An Adaptation of the Inter-
temporal Capital Asset Pricing Model"
and "Capital Markets, Portfolio Adjust-
ments and the Pricing of Oil by an OPEC
Member," given at the Finance Theory
Seminar, M.I.T.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on cartel models,
presented at the World Bank.
January 1976 Seminar on cartel models and on energy
demand presented by R.S. Pindyck at
the University of Tel Aviv, Israel.
Seminar on the OPEC pricing model given by
R.S. Pindyck at the Weitzman Institute,
Israel.
Presentation by H.D. Jacoby on "El Mercado
Mundid de Petroleo," given to a management
conference sponsored by the Banco de
Commercio of Mexico and the M.I.T. Club
of Mexico, Mexico City.
February 1976 Presentation by P.L. Eckbo on "The North Sea
Supply Forecast," at the Federal Energy
Administration.
Date
I -3
on
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Description
February 1976 (Con't.) Address by M.A. Adelman on "The Taiiker Industry
in the Context of the World Oil Market,"
at a conference sponsored by Den Norske
Creditbank and R.S. Platou, Sanderstollen,
Norway.
Talk by M.A. Adelman on market structure in
world oil, Princetcn iversity.
Talk by M.A. Adelman on the outlook in world
oil to 1985, given to the New York Society
of Security Analysts.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in a conference
on world energy problems, sponsored by the
United Nations Secretaria4.
March 1976 Presentation by R.S. Pindyck of a seminar on
cartel pricing models, Industrial Organization
Workshop, University of Pennsylvania.
Address by M.A. Adelman on aspects of the
petroleum market, American Bar Association
and Pennsylvania Law School Conference on
Economic Independence.
April 1976 Presentation by R.S. Pindyck of a seminar on
cartel pricing models, University of Montreal.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in the Annual
Petroleum Economics and Management Conference,
Northeastern University.
Seminar by M.A. Adelman on analysis of the oil
cartel, Boston University.
Address by M.A. Adelman on interaction of foreign
and domestic energy policies, Dartmouth
University.
Seminar on the M.I.T. World Oil Project, presented
by H.D. Jacoby to the Department of Mineral
Economics, College of Earth and Mineral
Sciences, Pennsylvania State University.
Testimony by H.D. Jacoby before the House
Committee on Science and Technology on
"Loan Guarantees for Commercial Demonstration
Facilities, with special emphasis on the
role of the world oil price in program
design and implementation.
Date
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Date Dcscriptj oin
May 1976 Seminar by R.S. I ndyck on c.: l oricirc :incels
at the N..BER icrkshoD on C:-cl T?:eorv ar.d
Economics, Palo Alto, California.
Presentation by P.L. Eckbo on oil supply modeling,
to the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration.
Presentation by P.L. Eckbo on oil prodction
functions, to the N:orwegian irnistry c O
Finance.
Address by M.A. Adelman on the future of the
oil cartel, to a Brookings Institution
Conference.
Testimony by M.A. Adelman to the Senate Banking
Committee, on the investment in domestic
substitutes for world oil.
Address by M.A. Adelman on world oil issues,
to the National Conference of Security
Analysts.
Serviceby M.A. Adelman on the Twentieth Century
Fund panel on international and domestic
energy policy (through January 1977).
June 1976 Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on cartel models, Industrial
Organization Seminar, Department of Economics,
University of California at Berkeley.
Boston Society of Security Analysts, address by
M.A. Adelman on world energy and oil
developments.
July 1976 Session by R.S. Pindyck on Energy Models, at
Summer Computer Simulation Conference,
Washington, D.C.
Paper presented by R.S. Pindyck on the Pricing and
Production of Exhaustible Resources, at NSF
Workshop on Natural Resources, Stanford
University, Palo Alto, California.
Date
September 1976 Presentation by R.S. Pindvck on Optimal Pricing
Models for Ehaustile Resource Cartels at
thle National Science Foundation, 'Washinton, D.C.
Presentation by R.S. Pindyck on Optimal Pricing
Models for Exhaustible Resource Cartels at
Department of Economics, University of Maryland,
Silver Spring, Maryland.
Presentation by R.S. Pindyck of paper, "lnternational
C:cmrarisons of the Residential Demand for Energy:
A Preliminary Analysis," at Econometric Society
Meetings, Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Session on Energy and Natural Resources, American
Economic Association Meetings, Atlantic City,
New Jersey; chaired by R.S. Pindyck.
Paper on Pricing Models for Exhaustible Resources,
presented by R.S. Pindyck to the Econometric
Society Meetings, Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Seminar on Optimal Pricing Models for Exhaustible
Resource Cartels presented by R.S. Pindyck at
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada.
October 1976 Presentation by M.A. Adelman to M.I.T. Industrial
Liaison Program of special symponium on "The
Economic and Political Aspects of American
Industry and Energy Dependence", Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Paper by H.D. Jacoby on M.I.T. World Oil Supply
Models, presented at Clarkson College of
Technology, Potsdam, New York.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on Exploration and Production
of Nonrenewable Resources, at London School of
Economics, London.
November 1976 Paper on M.I.T. World Oil Project Supply Forecasting
Methods, presented by H.D. Jacoby to I.E.A.
Supply Workshop, Paris, France.
Do £-'crilti oin
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Date Descriution
Noevn-l-,er, 1976 (Con't.) Seminar by R.S. Pindyck- on lieasurin Interrational
Differences in the Structure of Energ-c Demand,
Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on lodels of Optimal
Exploration and Production of nonrenewable
Resources at Hebrew University, Jerusalem,
Israel.
Decemb-rer 1976
January 1977
February 1977
March 1977
Address by I·.A. Adelnan to the Inter-American
Defense College, ort Lcslie J. cair,
Washington, D.C.
Participation by H.D. Jacoby and R.S. Pindyck in
U.S./German Energy Conference, Spitzingsee,
Bavaria.
Address by M.A. Adelman on international energy
and oil, to the National Bureau of Standards,
Conference on Energy, Columbia, Maryland.
Testimony by M.A. Adelman before the Joint Economic
Committee, Subcommittee on Energy.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in American
Enterprise Institute, Conference on Oil-
Industry Divestiture.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Energy, 95th Congress,
"Energy Independence or Interdependence: The
Agenda with OPEC".
Discussion of international and domestic energy
policy questions by M.A. Adelman and H.D. Jacoby,
in meeting with Secretary Schlesinger and other
members of the White House Energy Staff preparing
the National Energy Plan, Washington, D.C.
Participation by M.A. Adelman in the 17th Annual
Institute on Petroleum Exploration and Economics,
International Oil and Gas Educational Center,
Richardson, Texas.
Description
March 1977 (Con't.) Lectures, by .A. Adl-m.-n on i!-terraticnal oil
supply and demand, to the N orThwestern University
Petroleum ECorIomiCS & anaCgement ConIerence.
M.A. Adelman serves as member of panel advisory
panel to Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission, on suit against certain oil comianies
(through October 177).
Aipril 1977 Address by .D. Jacoy to the Time, InorDorated
Energy Conference, Williasurg, Vi-ginia.
Address by H.D. acoly to an M.I.T. Energy Seminar,
sponsored jointly with the California Energy
Commission, Ojai, California.
May 1977 Address by H.D. Jacoby on "The Energy Policy of the
United States--International Implications for
Political Relationships and World Trade," to the
4th Annual International Trade Conference of the
Southwest, Dallas, Texas.
Paper by H.D. Jacoby presented to the Harvard-M.I.T.-
Penn. Seminar on World Energy Models and Studies,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
June 1977 Participation by M.A. Adelman and H.D. Jacoby in a
Workshop on World Oil Supply-Demand Analysis,
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York.
Address by H.D. Jacoby to a Symposium on "An Energy
System for the 21st Century,"Sponsored by the
M.I.T. Club of Southern California, Los Angeles,
California.
Presentation by R.S. Pindyck on Models of Resource
Exploration and Production, at Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, California.
September 1977 Presentation by M.A. Adelman of Lecture on energy
economics and policy, to Sloan Fellows and
Senior Executives convocation at M.I.T.
Date
I- 
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Date Descriution
October 1977 Interview of M.A. AdelMcan by TClryo Shi mbun
(appeared in 12 parts, January 1978).
Dece--ner 1977 Presentation by R.S. Pindyck of talk on "The Future
of World Energy Markets," The Conference Board
of Canada, Toronto, Canada.
Presentation by R.S. Pindyck of talk on "International
Problems in Energy Policy," University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, California.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on "Models of Optimal
Resource Exploration and Production," University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, California.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on "The International
Cartelization of Exhaustible Resources," California
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California.
Participation by R.S. Pindyck as discussant at
Session on "Economics of the Middle East,"
American Economic Association Meetings, New York.
Session on Optimal Resource Exploration, AEA
Meetings, New York; chaired by R.S. Pindyck.
January 1978 Participation by H.D. Jacoby in U.S./Japanese meeting
on international energy issues, Tokyo, Japan.
Briefing on the M.I.T. World Oil Project, given by
H.D. Jacoby to representatives of the D.O.E.,
including persons from S.P.R.O., the Energy
Information Administration, International Affairs,
and Planning and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
Participation by H.D. Jacoby in U.S./German Energy
Policy Workshop, Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia.
Presentation by J.L. Paddock of a Seminar on "The
Integration of Petroleum Engineering and Economics
in an Aggregate Model of Oil Supply" to the
Department of Industrial Engineering, Stanford
University.
Description
March 1978 Presented by R.S. Pindyck, talk on "!4ols of
Optimal Resource Exploration and Production,"
Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Seminar by R.S. Pindyck on "Models of Optimal
Resource Exploration and Production," Stanford
University, Stanford, California.
Talk by R.S. Pindyck on "OPEC, Oil Prices, and the
Western Economies," Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Date
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Appendix C
Orqani:;ations tnich Have Received Data from the
M.I.T. World Oil Project
Person/Organization
Jim Reddington
OECD, Paris
Eithan Hochman
UC Berkeley
Tel Aviv University
Boum Jong Choe
The World Bank
Tamir Agmon
Tel Aviv University
Resources for the Future
Dr. F. nTys-Clement
L'Universite Libre
de Bruxelles, Belgium
FEA (now Department of Energy)
Washington, D.C.
Electric Power Research Institute
Palo Alto, California
Mary Headley
A.D. Little
Stanford Research Institute, International
Menlo Park, California
Shell Oil
Material Sent
- entire demand data base
- price and quantity information
- data for developing countries
- energy products prices
- entire demand data base
- entire
- energy
demand data base
products prices
- entire demand data base
- entire demand data base
- private consumption expenditure
on fuels
- retail price on fuels
- entire demand data base
- entire demand data base
C-l
